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We show that the effect of non-interest income on systemic risk exposures varies
with bank size and a country’s institutional setting. Non-interest income reduces
large banks’ systemic risk exposures, whereas it increases that of small banks. How-
ever, exploiting heterogeneity in countries’ institutional setting, we show that the
bright side of innovation by large banks (lower systemic risk exposure for diversi-
fied banks) disappears in countries with more private and asymmetric information,
more corruption and in concentrated banking markets. These empirical findings pro-
vide support for Saunders and Cornett (2014) who hypothesize which institutional
features make the materialization of conflicts of interest more likely.
Keywords: systemic risk, diversification, innovation, conflicts of interest, global
sample
JEL Classifications: G21, G28, L51
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1 Introduction
Deregulation, technological progress and financial innovation in the two decades prior to the
global financial crisis spurred banks to become larger and more diversified. This increase in bank
size and scope was believed to be profit- and value-enhancing through economies of scale and
scope, and (idiosyncratic bank) risk-reducing due to portfolio diversification benefits (see e.g.,
DeLong (2001), Laeven and Levine (2007), Demsetz and Strahan (1997), Stiroh and Rumble
(2006) or Baele, De Jonghe, and Vander Vennet (2007)). However, the onset and unwinding of
the global financial crisis of 2007-09 also illustrated a darker side of bank size and bank diversifi-
cation1. Banks’ size and scope made them systemically more important leading to too-big-to-fail
or too-complex-to-unwind paradigms. This has caused policymakers and researchers to re-assess
the optimal size and scope of banks. The general conclusion from recent studies is that larger
banks have higher (conditional) tail risk and that diversification leads to higher systemic risk.2
Surprisingly, the concepts of size and scope and their effects on systemic risk (exposures) are
usually analyzed in isolation. In most studies, the focus is either on one of the two or, when
they are jointly analyzed, on additive effects.3 Yet, the use of acronyms such as SIFI or LCBG,
1We follow the convention in this literature and use the word ’diversification’ to refer to the extent of universal
banking. That is, the extent to which banks have expanded their scope and combine traditional bank activities, which
mainly generate interest income, with non-traditional, non-interest income generating activities.
2Barth and Schnabel (2013) present an overview of the direct and indirect channels through which large banks
affect or are affected by systemic risk. Empirical evidence on the size-systemic risk relationship can be found in
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2013), Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012), Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia
(2012) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009). The impact of bank scope (or diversification) on systemic risk is
investigated by e.g. Wagner (2010), Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2011), Boot and Ratnovski (2013), De Jonghe
(2010), Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012).
3Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012), Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012) and De Jonghe (2010) are
examples of empirical papers that focus on the impact of bank size on systemic risk, while controlling for bank
scope (or vice versa), without interacting them.
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which stand for Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Large and Complex Banking
Groups, by regulators and supervisors do indicate that they perceive the mix of size and scope
(complexity) to have multiplicative (or interaction) effects as well. Similarly, the public percep-
tion is also tilted towards the belief that the mix of bank size and scope results in hazardous
effects. This paper fills this gap in the literature by exploring two issues. First, we examine the
joint and interactive impact of both bank size and scope on banks’ exposure to systemic risk.
Second, by exploiting a cross-country sample, we assess whether these relationships are affected
by a country’s institutional setting, in particular by factors affecting the realization of conflicts
of interests.
We make two important contributions to the academic literature. Unconditionally, the net im-
pact of diversification on risk depends on the relative strength of a bright and dark side. The
bright side of diversification stems from the scope for risk reduction within the financial insti-
tution (Dewatripont and Mitchell (2005)) and risk sharing with the financial system (van Oordt
(2013)). The dark side of diversification originates in the complexity that comes along with
combining various financial services. We are the first to show that the strength of the bright
side vis-à-vis the dark side depends on bank size.4 We find that the dark side of diversification
dominates for small banks, whereas the bright side effects of diversification and innovation dom-
inate for medium and large banks. More specifically, using a sample of listed banks across the
globe over the period 1997-2011, we find that the initial positive impact of non-interest income
(NII) on systemic risk exposure (measured by the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES))5 becomes
4Goddard, McKillop, and Wilson (2008) show for a sample of US credit unions that the impact of diversification
on financial performance (measured as risk-adjusted accounting profits) is size-dependent.
5The Marginal Expected Shortfall corresponds with a bank’s expected equity loss per dollar in a year conditional
on the banking sector experiencing one of its5% lowest returns in that given year. As in Acharya, Pedersen,
Philippon, and Richardson (2012), we use the opposite of the returns, such that a higher MES implies more systemic
2
smaller with size and turns negative when total assets equal964 million US$. For almost half
of the banks in the sample, there is a significant negative impact of NII on MES. Hence, we are
the first to document that combining size with scope leads to multiplicative effects on systemic
risk. The explanation for this finding is multifaceted. Smaller banks are more opaque and less
transparent (Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004)), and are therefore more inclined to en-
gage in riskier and value-destroying activities, which encourages the impact of the dark side of
diversification. Furthermore, larger banks have on average more sophisticated risk management
techniques (Hughes and Mester (1998)), have more experienced management and employees
and may therefore take more advantage of the bright side of diversification (Cerasi and Daltung
(2000)). Put differently, small banks are more likely going to lack the specific knowledge and
tools to handle new business ventures or manage complex financial products (Milbourn, Boot,
and Thakor (1999)). Concerning the dark side, larger banks are typically subject to a larger
scrutiny by various disciplining stakeholders (Freixas, Loranth, and Morrison (2007)), which
may refrain large banks from taking excessive risk. Importantly, however, stakeholders will only
be able to properly discipline banks when the institutional setting and information environment
allow them to do this. This brings us to our second contribution.
Our second contribution consists in showing that the bright side of diversification for large
banks crucially depends on country characteristics that facilitate the creation of conflicts of in-
terests. The potential for conflicts of interest is the main rationale why innovation by banks and
expansion into non-traditional banking activities is seen as detrimental for banking system sta-
bility. For an excellent overview of the theoretical predictions and empirical results, we refer the
reader to Mehran and Stulz (2007), Drucker and Puri (2007) and Saunders and Cornett (2014).
We directly test the assertions of Saunders and Cornett (2014) that the likelihood with which po-
tential conflicts of interest in universal banks turn into realized conflicts of interest depends on (i)
risk.
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imperfect information on banks, (ii) the level of concentration in the banking sector, and (iii) the
value of reputation. These three features of the institutional setting facilitate the materialization
of conflicts of interest (Mehran and Stulz (2007) and Saunders and Cornett (2014)). Hence, they
will lead to negative effects of scope expansion for both small and large banks. However, an en-
vironment with more information sharing, more private monitoring, reputation concerns or more
competition, works as a disciplining device for large banks and induces them to differentiate and
innovate for the better cause.
These two contributions have important policy implications. First of all, the negative interaction
effect implies that implementing one regulatory reform proposal, i.e. downsizing banks, may
weaken another policy, ring-fencing or limiting activities. Second, ring-fencing small banks or
forcing small banks to get back to the basics is always desirable to reduce systemic risk. Third,
our results indicate that there might be a bright side to allowing large banks to expand into
non-interest income conditional on the institutional setting. This creates a trade-off. It may be
desirable to restrict activities of large banks if there is low information sharing, low private mon-
itoring, high corruption and more concentration. On the other hand, improving transparency and
the flow of information might be a desirable alternative to ring-fencing. Fourth, our results also
indicate that downsizing is unconditionally desirable from a systemic risk point of view for two
reasons. Not only is the effect of size on the systemic risk exposure always positive (for all levels
of the non-interest income share), downsizing will also reduce concentration (and hence limits
the scope for conflicts of interests).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the sample construc-
tion as well as the main variables of interest. Subsequently, in Section 3, we provide empirical
4
evidence in favour of an interaction effect between size and diversification. Our second contribu-
tion, i.e. analyzing which factors mitigate or reinforce this interaction effect is shown in Section
4. We subject this new and intriguing finding in the relationship between diversification, size and
systemic risk to a battery of robustness checks, which are discussed in Section 5.
2 Descriptive Statistics
To gauge the relationship between bank size, non-interest income and systemic risk, we combine
data from several sources. We obtain information on banks’ balance sheets and income state-
ments from Bankscope, which is a database compiled by Fitch/Bureau Van Dijk that contains
information on banks around the globe, based on publicly available data-sources. Bankscope
contains information for listed, delisted as well as privately held banks. While Bankscope does
not contain stock market information on a daily basis (which is what we need to compute a
systemic risk indicator), it does contain information on the ticker as well as the ISIN number
of (de)listed banks’ equity, which enables matching Bankscope with Datastream. From Datas-
tream, we retrieve information on a bank’s stock price as well as its market capitalization. This
merged Bankscope-Datastream sample yields a panel of16507 bank-year observations, distrib-
uted over15 years and76 countries6. We include commercial banks (44:5% of our sample), bank
holding companies (51%), saving banks and cooperatives (4:5%). Our data span the period of
1997-2011.
The dependent variable is a bank’s systemic risk exposure. A bank’s exposure to systemic
risk is measured by the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), as proposed by Acharya, Pedersen,
6In terms of geographical spread, US banks constitute the largest part of our sample (1137 banks out of 2199).
However, this US dominance does not impact our main findings, as our results also hold when using various sub-
samples (including a non-US sample) or when weighting observations such that each country-year combination gets
equal weight. A list of countries and number of banks is available on request.
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Philippon, and Richardson (2012). Mathematically, the MES of banki at timet is given by the
following formula:
MESi;t(Q) = E[Ri;tjRm;t < V aRQm;t] (1)
In Equation (1),Ri;t denotes the daily stock return of banki at time t, Rm;t the return on
a banking sector index at timet. V aRQm;t stands for Value-at-Risk, which is a threshold value
such that the probability of a loss exceeding this value equals the probabilityQ. Q is an extreme
percentile, such that we look at systemic events. Following common practice in the literature, we
compute MES using the opposite of the returns such that a higher MES means a larger systemic
risk exposure. Conceptually, MES measures the increase in the risk of the system induced by a
marginal increase in the weight of banki in the system7. The higher a bank’s MES (in absolute
value), the higher is the contribution of banki to the risk of the banking system.
In this paper, we measure MES for each bank-year combination and follow common practice
by settingQ at5%. Doing so,MESi;t corresponds with banki’s expected equity loss per dollar
in yeart conditional on the market experiencing one of its5% lowest returns in that given year.
While Datastream provides return indices for the banking sector indices, it does not do so for
all countries in our sample. For consistency across countries, we therefore construct the (value-
weighted) indices ourselves. Moreover, the bank for which we compute the MES is excluded
from the banking sector index for a given country. The independent variables of interest are
bank size and non-interest income. The former is computed as the natural logarithm of total
assets expressed in 2007 US dollars. We measure a bank’s share of non-interest income to
7The Expected Shortfall of the market portfolio is given by:E[Rm;tjRm;t < V aRQm;t] =
NX
i=1
wi;tE[Ri;tjRm;t < V aRQm;t], and is hence equal to the weighted sum of the MES of all banks in the sys-
tem. The first derivative of the Expected Shortfall of the market portfolio with respect towi;t equals the MES of
bank i at time t.
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total operating income, by dividing other operating income (which comprises trading income,
commissions and fees as well as all other non-interest income) by the sum of interest income and
other operating income.8 Summary statistics of all variables are reported in Table 1.
<Insert Table 1 around here>
The other bank-specific variables capture various other dimensions of a bank’s business
model. In particular, we include proxies for leverage (capital-to-asset ratio), the funding struc-
ture (share of deposits in sum of deposits and money market funding), asset mix (loans to assets
ratio), profitability (return-on-equity), annual growth in total assets as well as expected credit risk
(Loan Loss Provision to Interest Income). These variables are often used in other studies; and
the values are comparable to e.g.: Laeven and Levine (2009) or Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens
(2013). We winsorize all variables at the1 percent level to mitigate the impact of outliers.
3 The impact of Bank Size and Non-Interest Income on Sys-
temic Risk
Our first goal is to empirically show the impact of bank size, non-interest income, and their
interaction on banks’ Marginal Expected Shortfall. To that end, we estimate regressions corre-
sponding with the following equation:
MESi;t+1 = 1 Si ze i;t + 2NIIi;t + 3 Si zei;t NIIi;t +Xi;t + ui + vt+1 + "i;t+1 (2)
8In the robustness section, we decompose non-interest income in its constituents (i.e. commission and fee
income, trading income and other operating income) and find similar results for each of the components. Moreover,
we also resort to alternative datasources for US banks (regulatory filings of Bank Holding Companies, i.e. the
FRY9C reports) that allow for an even finer decomposition. The results are robust to (i) using only US data and (ii)
alternative non-interest income decompositions.
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Next to including a proxy for bank size and non-interest income (NII), we control for various
bank- and country-specific characteristics that may affect the Marginal Expected Shortfall. These
are represented by the vectorXi;t and are described in Section 2. In addition, we include bank
(ui) and year (vt+1) fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the bank level. Let us stress
once more that we compute MES using the opposite of the returns such that a higher MES
means a larger systemic risk exposure. The results are reported in Table 2 and we will focus our
discussion only on the impact of the variables of interest, which corresponds with the coefficients
1; 2 and3.
<Insert Table 2 around here>
In the first column, we report the results when imposing the constraint that there is no inter-
action effect between bank size and non-interest income, i.e. we impose that3 = 0. Hence,
we impose additivity, which is the benchmark in the literature. We find that size has a positive
effect on MES. Larger banks will experience a larger reduction in market value of their stock
if there is a systemic event. The impact of NII on MES is negative and significant. Moreover,
the correlation coefficient9 of size and non-interest income (after the within transformation), is
insignificant, reducing multicollinearity issues. The sign, significance and magnitude of this co-
efficient is in line with the results reported in Engle, Moshirian, Saghal, and Zhang (2012) in
their specification including bank fixed effects. The economic magnitude of this estimated effect
is small. A one standard deviation increase in the share of non-interest income in total income,
holding all else equal, leads to an increase in MES of0:1355 (i.e. the coefficient, 0:961, times
the standard deviation of NII,0:141). This is only a moderate impact on the MES, which has a
9A full correlation table is reported in the online appendix. In particular, we report the correlation coefficients of
the raw, untransformed data as well as those of the data after the within transformation. The latter implies that we
first subtract, for each variable, the bank-specific mean. This setup corresponds with our regression which includes
bank fixed effects.
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mean of1:9 and a standard deviation of2:4. In column 2, we relax the restriction that3 = 0 and
find that the interaction coefficient is negative and strongly significant. While the sign and mag-
nitude of the size coefficient are unaffected, we now obtain that the coefficient on the non-interest
income share is positive, large and significant. Hence, we find that expanding into non-interest
income leads to higher systemic risk exposures for small banks. For example, based on the re-
sults in column 2 of Table 2, a one standard deviation increase in non-interest income for a bank
at the5th size percentile leads to a rise in the MES of0:175, which corresponds with a9:2%
increase in MES for the average bank in our sample.10 However, for larger banks the impact
of non-interest income on MES becomes smaller and turns negative when ln(TA) equals6:871,
which corresponds with963:7 million US$ (see bottom panel of Table 2). Figure 1 depicts the
marginal effect of the non-interest income share on MES over the observed range of bank size in
the sample.
<Insert Figure 1 around here>
For small banks, the effect is economically large and positive and significantly different from
zero. Subsequently, there is a range of values of ln(TA)=[5:86   7:66], around the "sign-switch
point" of 6:871, at which the impact of NII is not significantly different from zero. The bound-
aries of this range correspond with the14th and51th percentile of bank size. Hence, for the14%
smallest banks in the sample, an increase in NII leads to an increase in MES. For the49% largest
banks in the sample, there is a significant impact of NII on MES as well, but it goes in the other
direction. For larger banks, the impact is significantly sizeable and can become economically
large (with point estimates exceeding 4). For example, a one standard deviation increase in
non-interest income for a bank at the95th size percentile leads to a drop in the MES of0:52,
10The standard deviation of the non-interest income share is0:14. The5th percentile of ln(total assets) is5:15
in our sample. Using the coefficients from column2 of Table 2, we can then calculate the impact as follows:
0:14  (5:001  0:728  5:15) = 0:175.
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which corresponds with a27:5% decrease in the MES for the average bank in our sample. Fur-
thermore, the effect of a change in NII is twice as large for a bank with total assets of207 billion
US$ (=ln(TA) of12:24) compared with a bank which has14 billion US$ in Total Assets (=ln(TA)
of 9:55). An equally large but opposite effect is observed for a small bank with total assets worth
66Million US$ (=ln(TA) of 4:19) compared with a bank which has14 billion US$ in Total Assets
(=ln(TA) of 9:55). Hence, not controlling for the interaction effect between size and non-interest
income may lead to misguided conclusions. The interaction term also rationalizes why the effect
of NII seems small in column 1. The effect in the first column averages out and obscures the
large positive effect of NII for small banks and large negative impact of NII for large banks.
In sum, we find that larger banks have a larger MES than small banks and that the effect of
NII depends on the size of the bank. Alternative revenues increase the exposure to systemic risk
for small banks, but reduce it for larger banks. Put differently, the dark side of diversification
and innovation dominates for small banks, while for large banks the bright side of diversifica-
tion outweighs the potential negative consequences. Furthermore, additional robustness checks,
which will be discussed in Section 5, indicate that both the statistical significance as well as the
economic magnitudes (particularly regarding the value of bank size at which the sign switch for
non-interest income occurs) are robust to endogeneity concerns, additional (market-based) con-
trol variables, alternative risk measures, decomposing non-interest income in its subcomponents
as well as several sample splits.
10
4 Conflicts of Interest: Exploiting Cross-country Heterogene-
ity
4.1 Theoretical Motivation and Empirical Proxies
We find that the bright side of diversification dominates the dark side for large banks, but not so
for small banks. One potential reason is that large banks are, compared to small banks, typically
subject to a larger scrutiny by various disciplining stakeholders. However, these stakeholders
will only be able to properly discipline these banks when the information environment or insti-
tutional setting allows them to do this. If not, large banks do have incentives to abuse conflicts
of interest. Mehran and Stulz (2007) and Saunders and Cornett (2014) conjecture that the scope
for exploiting conflicts of interest is larger when (i) there is more asymmetric or imperfect infor-
mation, (ii) reputation concerns and fear of litigation are low, and (iii) the banking sector is more
concentrated (there is no alternative). We take advantage of our cross-country sample to exploit
differences in institutional settings11 across countries in each of these three dimensions. In par-
ticular, we measure imperfect or asymmetric information between a bank and other economic
agents with three proxies. First, we employ a private monitoring index to analyze the strength
of the information environment. The private monitoring index, taken from the Bank Regulation
and Supervision database (Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013)), ranges from 0 to 12, where larger
11Our cross-country sample offers the advantage that we can exploit variation in the institutional settings in
which banks operate. We can therefore take a different approach compared to prior empirical research on conflicts
of interest (for a survey of that literature, please see Drucker and Puri (2007)). Prior studies use detailed contract-
level data (see e.g. Kroszner and Rajan (1994) or Puri (1996)) and investigate the actual realization of conflicts of
interest. Institutional features will make the exploitation of conflicts of interest more likely in some countries than
in others. Hence, we do not look at the actual exploitation of conflicts of interest, but at the scope for the realization
of such conflicts.
11
values indicate greater regulatory empowerment of the monitoring of banks by private investors.
Put differently, it captures how heavily regulators and policy makers try to incentivize private
investors to monitor financial institutions. For example, it will be easier for private investors to
monitor financial institutions when the latter have to provide more detailed information on their
activities, are required to obtain certified audits and are rated by external agencies. More and
better information on a banks’ activities should then reduce information asymmetry problems
between banks and the public/outside investors, which in turn reduces the probability that the
dark side of diversification will be able to manifest itself. Second, a well-developed credit regis-
ter will provide detailed information to supervisors and participating banks on other banks’ credit
quality by gathering data on the amount borrowed by each firm, default rates on loans, and so
on. Hence, these registers should reduce the potential private information advantage and mitigate
overall information asymmetries. To measure the information content of credit registries, we use
the credit depth of information index. This is an indicator from the World Bank Doing Business
database that takes into account the rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit
information available through public or private credit registries. The index ranges between 0 and
6, with a higher value indicating that more information is available. Thirdly, we also include a
proxy for Official Supervisory Power, also constructed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013). The
index measures the degree to which the country’s bank supervisory agency has the authority to
take specific actions. The official supervisory index has a maximum value of 14 and a minimum
value of 0, where larger numbers indicate greater power.
Reputation concerns will be low whenever fraudulent actions will remain undetected or are
not penalized. We hypothesize that bank fraud is more likely and reputation concerns are lower
in countries in which corruption levels are higher. We use the Heritage Freedom from Corruption
Index to measure how corrupt a government is.12 The index ranges between 0 and 100, where a
12Bank fraud data is available (see e.g. the proxy of corruption in bank lending used by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and
12
higher index indicates less corruption.
Finally, in concentrated markets, banks should be less concerned with reputation concerns
and market retaliation as there are no or fewer alternatives to go to. Bank market concentration
is proxied by the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (HHI). This index measures market
concentration by summing the squares of the market shares (based on total assets) of all banks
(listed and privately held) in a country. The higher the index, the more concentrated the banking
market. Summary statistics of these variables are reported in the bottom panel of Table 1.
4.2 Setup and Results
To measure the impact of the institutional setting on the interaction effect, we expand Equation
2 by adding the country-specific factors of interest (one-by-one) and their interaction terms with
bank size and diversification:
MESi;t+1 = 1 Si zei;t+2NIIi;t+3Zi;t+4 Interactionsi;t+Xi;t+ui+vt+1+"i;t+1 (3)
MESi;t+1, Si zei;t andNII are defined as in the previous section.Zi;t is one of the country-
specific variables under investigation,Interactionsi;t is a vector including all interaction terms
between bank size, non-interest income and the country-specific characteristic, andXi;t is a
group of bank specific and macro-economic control variables. Additionally, we also control for
bank (ui) and time (vt+1) fixed effects. Estimating this equation allows us to analyze the impact
Levine (2006)), but unfortunately only for a single year (2000), whereas the freedom from (government) corruption
indicator is time-varying and measured annually. We find that the correlation between corruption in bank lending in
and the freedom from government corruption in the year 2000 is negative and significant ( 68%). Similarly, Barth,
Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) show in a regression framework with control variables that measures of macro-corruption
are significantly related to corruption in bank lending.
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of country-specific characteristics on the relationship between non-interest income and systemic
risk, while taking into account that the impact could differ for either small or large banks.13
The impact of the five aforementioned country-specific proxies on the relationship between bank
diversification and systemic risk is reported in Table 3. We report both the regression results (left
panel) and the marginal effect of NII on MES for different values of the country-specific variables
(right panel). The triple interaction term (in bold) has the expected sign and is significant in three
out of four cases. This provides support for the hypothesis that an institutional environment that
facilitates the potential for conflicts of interest makes it more likely that an increase in non-
interest income leads to a higher MES for larger banks as well. To facilitate the interpretation
and provide insights in the economic magnitudes of the effects, we will mainly focus on the
marginal effects that are reported in the right panel. We calculate the marginal effect of a change
in diversification on systemic risk exposures for countries that have a low, median or a high level
of the country-specific proxy of the scope for conflicts of interest. The low group is based on
the country at the10th percentile of the country-specific proxy, the median group is based on the
country at the50th percentile and the high group is based on the country at the90th percentile. At
the same time, we calculate the effect for each subgroup for three types of banks (small, median,
large), based on the10th, 50th and90th percentile of bank size in our sample. For each bank
size-country characteristic combination, the marginal effect is given in the first column, while
the second column shows the corresponding p-value (in italics). Furthermore, the last column
shows the difference (and the corresponding p-value) between the impact of diversification for
13Lee, Hsieh, and Yang (2014) provide evidence that the relationship between revenue diversification and bank
performance/risk depends upon country characteristics. We differ from Lee, Hsieh, and Yang (2014) in at least three
dimensions. That is, they only look at a sample of 29 Asia-Pacific countries, focus on the country-heterogeneity in
the impact of diversification on bank performance (irrespective of bank size) and explain the cross-country variation
in that relationship with differences in financial structures and reforms (bank- or market-based systems).
14
banks in the low country group and banks in the high country group (for a given size). Similarly,
the last row shows the differences for banks operating in the same country group but belonging
to a different size group (low versus high).
<Insert Table 3 around here>
The results in Table 3 reveal a couple of interesting patterns. First, all proxies confirm that
an environment more conducive to the realization of conflicts of interests leads to a larger impact
of non-interest income on MES (irrespective of bank size), i.e. high-low (in the last column of
the RHS panel) is negative for the first four proxies and positive for the last one (concentration).
This implies that diversification into non-interest income activities will lead to higher systemic
risk exposures in countries with non-transparent information environments, weaker supervisory
power, more corruption or high concentration. Second, in line with our previous findings, the
results in Table 3 confirm that the effect of non-interest income depends on the size of the bank.
However, in addition to the results in the previous section, the results in Table 3 also illustrate
that the average negative relation between non-interest income and MES for large banks, e.g.
depicted to the right of the turning point in Figure 1, masks cross-country variation. The aver-
age negative effect is the result of a significant positive or non-significant negative relationship
for banks operating in institutional settings conducive to conflicts of interest (e.g., low informa-
tion, 4:778, high corruption, 0:913, or high concentration,1:93) and a significant and large
negative relationship for banks operating in institutional settings mitigating conflicts of interest
(e.g. more information, 4:266, low corruption, 3:928, or low concentration, 3:773).
Third, there is no statistically significant difference in the impact of the NII-share on MES for
large versus small banks in countries with non-transparent information environments, more cor-
ruption or high concentration. The p-values of a differential response for large versus small banks
is at least 0.20 when there is low information sharing, high corruption or high concentration.
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In sum, we document that the sign switch disappears if the institutional setting facilitates the
materialization of conflicts of interest14. Hence, it will lead to negative effects of scope expansion
for both small and large banks. However, an environment with more information sharing, more
private monitoring, stronger supervisory monitoring, less corruption or more competition, works
as a disciplining device for large banks and induces them to differentiate and innovate for the
better cause. For small banks, on the other hand, the effect remains negative and does not vary
with these institutional features.
Overall, the results in this section confirm that the scope for conflicts of interests has a size-
able impact on the multiplicative effect of bank size and diversification on systemic risk. If the
institutional environment favors exploiting conflicts of interest, then diversification or innovation
will lead to higher systemic risk exposures, both for large and small banks. On the other hand, di-
versification into non-interest income activities (innovation) could have a bright side for systemic
stability in countries with transparent information environments, strong supervisors, less corrup-
tion or lower bank market concentration. Our results also indicate that the scope for conflicts of
interest matters more for large banks. This is consistent with the idea that the larger scrutiny, by
various disciplining stakeholders, to which large banks are typically subject, can only play its
role in an environment that forces banks to be more transparent about their activities.
4.3 Economic Magnitudes
What do the results reported in Table 3 and discussed above imply quantitatively and qualita-
tively? Using the depth of information sharing indicator as an information environment proxy,
14Supervisory power is the exception to this general finding. The impact of NII on MES is negative for large banks
irrespective of the strength of supervisory power. However, the gap between large and small banks’ their impact of
NII on MES is increasing in supervisory power strength, indicating that stronger supervisors are especially beneficial
for disciplining the behavior of large banks.
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our results indicate that a one standard deviation in the non-interest income ratio leads a to jump
in the MES ranging between0:29 (for small banks) and0:67 (for large banks)15 when the po-
tential scope for asymmetric information and conflicts of interest is high. For large banks, this
increase in MES with0:67, corresponds with a35 percent increase of the average MES. On the
other hand, when banks are operating in a highly transparent information environment, a one
standard deviation increase in the non-interest income ratio would lead to a change in the MES
ranging between0:07 (for small banks) and 0:60 (for large banks), indicating that diversifica-
tion can potentially contribute to a more stable banking system when the information environ-
ment is well developed. The impact of the information environment is also economically large.
The differences between the impact of a change in diversification are reported in the high-low
column and indicate that the impact of an increase in diversification is always significantly more
positive (hence more risk) in countries with an underdeveloped information environment. Fur-
ther focussing on the depth of information sharing, our results show that a one standard deviation
increase in the non-interest income ratio for a median sized bank operating in a low information
environment raises the MES with0:43. This corresponds with a23 percentage increase in MES
for the average bank in our sample, or, put differently, a19 percent standard deviation increase in
the MES. If that same bank would be operating in a highly transparent information environment,
a standard deviation increase in the non-interest income ratio would lead to a reduction in the
MES with10 percent, which equals an8 percent standard deviation decrease in MES. A similar
and even stronger effect is found for large banks. The results for large banks indicate that a one
standard deviation increase in the non-interest income ratio for a large bank operating in a low
15The standard deviation of the non-interest income ratio in our sample is0:14. Based on the results in Table
3, the impact of a one standard deviation increase for a large bank operating in a low information environment
thus equals0:14  4:778 = 0:67, which equals35 percent of the average MES (1:92) or 28 percent of its standard
deviation (2:35) in our sample. We make similar computations throughout this subsection.
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information environment raises the MES with0:67 (= 0:14  4:77), which corresponds with a35
percent increase in MES for the average bank in our sample. At the other extreme, if the same
bank is operating in a country with a well developed credit register, a one standard deviation
increase in the non-interest income ratio leads to a drop in MES of0:60 (= 0:14  4:26), which
equals a reduction in average MES of31 percent.
The results for the other information environment proxy (the private monitoring index), the
freedom from corruption index and bank concentration are qualitatively similar. Banks operating
in countries in which the potential scope for asymmetric information problems is lower will
benefit more from an increase in diversification - in terms of systemic risk - compared to banks
operating in a country with highly opaque information environments. For example, a standard
deviation increase in the non-interest income ratio of a median sized bank operating in a country
with a low private monitoring (freedom of corruption) index, leads to an increase in the MES
with 7 (1:5) percent, while a similar raise in non-interest income would lead to a decrease in
MES with 12 (8) percent if that bank would be operating in a highly transparent environment.
For medium-sized and large banks, an improvement in the strength of supervisory power leads
to a significant lower impact of NII on MES. The differential impact of a one standard deviation
increase in NII on MES for a median-sized bank operating in a high versus low supervisory
environment is 0:19 (= 0:14   1:352), whereas a similar computation for large banks yields
an effect that is twice as large (0:14   2:673 =  0:37), indicating that supervisory power
is more effective for disciplining large banks’ behaviour. The difference in impact between
high and low concentrated markets is reported in the last two columns in the HHI panel of
Table 3. The difference is always positive and significant, and ranges between1:25 for small
banks and5:70 for large banks. More specifically, a standard deviation increase in the non-
interest income ratio for small (large) banks operating in a concentrated banking environment
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leads a to jump in the MES of0:29 (0:27), which corresponds with an increase of around16
(14) percent for the average bank in our sample. On the other hand, when a similar small (large)
bank operates in an unconcentrated banking market, a standard deviation increase in the non-
interest income ratio leads to a change in the MES of0:11 ( 0:53). This lends support to the
idea that concentrated banking markets can suffer from too-important-to-fail problems, which
will give banks an incentive to opt for more risky assets when they decide to (further) diversify
their revenue stream.
5 Robustness Tests16
In this section, we briefly discuss the results of a large number of additional tests and specifi-
cations, which indicate that the statistical significance as well as the economic magnitudes that
we find in our analyses are robust. First of all, we subject the baseline regression (column 2 of
Table 2) to a number of robustness tests to make sure that our results are not driven by omitted
variables, endogeneity issues, the chosen systemic risk measure or (implicit or explicit) bail-out
guarantees for large banks. In our baseline specification in column 2, we include bank-fixed ef-
fects to control for unobserved bank heterogeneity. To show that this is indeed important, we
first relax this assumption in column 3 in which we include country fixed effects, but no bank
fixed effects. We observe a substantial drop in the R-squared from57% in column 2 to48% in
column 3, indicating a large scope for an omitted variable bias at the bank level. Admittedly,
bank fixed effects only capture time-invariant bank-specific omitted variables, such as ownership
or management who jointly decide on the risk profile as well as the business model. It can still
be that there are time-varying omitted bank characteristics that drive both MES and the decision
16A more detailed discussion as well as additional tables are available on request or can be found on the authors’
personal webpages.
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to diversify. In column 4, we report the results from an instrumental variable specification. We
instrument NII and the interaction terms with their lag and a bank level operating cost ratio. The
rationale behind this instrument is based on the theories of Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)
and Scharfstein and Stein (2000), which both imply that in more diversified firms weaker di-
visions will potentially get cross-subsidized by stronger ones, which will impact the cost level
of diversified firms. The statistical tests validate the choice of our instrument set and indicate
robustness. In subsequent tests, we analyze the robustness of the results when using alternative
dependent variables. We find similar results when using respectively a systemic risk contribu-
tion measure (CoV aR, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009)), total bank risk (total volatility of
bank returns) or an alternative MES (that includes the bank itself in the banking index). The
results in columns 5 to 7 indicate that the finding is not measure-specific, but also carries over to
other risk measures that have been often used in the empirical literature relating non-interest in-
come to bank risk (see e.g. Stiroh (2006)) or focusing on systemic risk (see, e.g., Brunnermeier,
Dong, and Palia (2012)). The largest banks (which are usually also more diversified) may benefit
from implicit government guarantees (bailing out big banks) encouraging risk-taking, possibly
affecting our baseline result. Unreported regressions show that our results are unaffected when
including size squared or a dummy variable that is one for banks that are large with respect to
the home country’s GDP (as a proxy for being too-big-to-fail). Our results are also robust to (i)
excluding the US banks from the sample, (ii) employing weighted least squares such that each
country-year combination gets equal weight, (iii) splitting the sample in a pre-2007 crisis and a
post-crisis period, (iv) using commercial banks only, (v) using bank holding companies only, (vi)
dropping mergers and acquisitions (by excluding banks that shrink or grow substantially, (vii)
bank exits.
We also analyze whether the results are robust to using alternative proxies for non-traditional
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banking activities. First of all, we examine whether the interaction effect is driven by a particular
subcomponent of non-interest income. In columns 2 to 4 of Table 4, we focus on three non-
interest income components which are available for our worldwide sample of banks. They are
respectively fee income share, trading income share or other (non-interest) income share. For
each component, the outcome is qualitatively similar to our baseline result. We always find a
positive direct effect of the non-interest income component on MES, while the interaction term
is negative. In an unreported regression, we include all three shares and their interactions with
size simultaneously and find similar results. We also analyze US bank holding companies sep-
arately using Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and FR9YC data, which are more
detailed and allow for alternative groupings of non-interest income components. Our initial result
also holds when using these alternative data sources. Moreover, we also differentiate between a
volatile and stable part of non-interest income as Calomiris and Nissim (2014) or a decomposi-
tion into traditional fee income, fee for services income and stakeholder income as in DeYoung
and Torna (2013). These unreported tests also confirm the presence of a significant interaction
effect of bank size and non-interest income on systemic risk exposures and this for each of the
subcomponents.
<Insert Table 4 around here>
Furthermore, we also construct two revenue diversification measures.Div(HHI) = 1   
interest income
total income
2    non interest income
total income
2
, is a diversification measure based on the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (see e.g. Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhauser (2010)). We also follow Laeven
and Levine (2007) and define revenue diversification as follows:
Div(LL) = 1  
 interest income   non interest income
total income
. The results using these diversification
measures rather than the non-interest income share are very similar as can be seen from the
results reported in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4. Finally, in column 7, we use another proxy
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for the shift to non-traditional banking, which is the ratio of the total off-balance sheet position
to total assets. Note that off-balance sheet items are also not necessarily only non-traditional
banking activities as it may also contain the committed but unused component of credit lines
or other credit-related commitments. As with the NII share, we find a positive and significant
coefficient on the ratio of OBS to total assets and a negative and significant interaction effect
with bank size. Moreover, we find that the value of bank size at which the relationship between
MES and OBS-to-total assets switches from being positive to being negative is very similar to
the one obtained in the baseline specification reported in column 1 of Table 4.
Next to analyzing the robustness of the result to using alternative proxies for diversification,
we also investigate whether the results hold when we use a relative size measure (market share
within a country) rather than absolute size. The results are reported in the last column of Table 4.
We find a positive and significant effect on NII and market share and a negative and significant
interaction effect, which is further evidence of the robustness of our baseline specification. Using
alternative setups in which we replace market share with a binary classification of banks whose
assets are above or below the median (or mean) bank’s assets (in a country year) yield similar
results.
Our last set of (unreported) robustness checks deals with the analysis of the triple interaction
effect. In the absence of an exogenous cross-country shock to the scope for conflicts of interest,
we have to resort to another external validation technique. In particular, we design a placebo test
by examining whether other country characteristics, which are not directly related to exploiting
conflicts of interests, would also lead to a significantly different interaction effect. In particular,
we examine whether we find similar patterns while including proxies of (i) the level of deposit
insurance, (ii) restrictions on the permissible range of activities, (iii) herding of activities, (iv)
crisis times, (v) monetary policy conditions, (vi) GDP per capita. In general, we do not find that
22
the impact of NII-share on MES differs depending on the value of these country characteristics.
The non-significant triple interaction results in these specifications make it less likely that the
results in the Section 4 are driven by other country-specific factors or that the obtained results
are random and obtained by chance.
6 Conclusion
Bank supervisors across the globe pay special attention to financial institutions that are seen as
both large and complex entities as they pose a challenge to financial stability. However, how
size and scope interact in their impact on systemic risk is ignored in the academic literature.
Our results indicate that scope expansion and innovation (venturing into non-traditional banking
activities) is less detrimental for systemic risk the larger the bank is and even becomes benefi-
cial (i.e. reduces systemic risk exposures) for medium sized and large banks. Furthermore, we
show that country characteristics that affect the scope for and realization of conflicts of interest
mitigate the impact of this interaction effect. The results in this paper can help in evaluating sug-
gested policy reform proposals that followed the global financial crisis. This paper documents
that an increase in size leads to larger systemic risk exposures. Hence, scaling down the size of
the banks will lead to less systemic risk. Furthermore, from a systemic risk point of view, forcing
banks to go back to the basic activities is unambiguously good for small banks, irrespective of
the institutional setting. On the other hand, systemic risk exposures may increase if large banks
are ring-fenced, depending on the institutional setting. For large banks, ring fencing their activi-
ties may lower systemic risk, if they operate in an environment that facilitates the exploitation of
conflicts of interest. Hence, improving information disclosure, both within and outside the finan-
cial system might be a substitute for restricting large banks’ permissible range of activities. If
large banks are forced to disclose more information, they will have less incentives to exploit the
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bad side of non-interest income generating activities. Put differently, information disclosure and
less concentration might make it more likely that the bright side of innovation and diversification
will prevail over the bad side.
This paper identifies a negative interaction effect between size and non-interest income in
their relationship with systemic risk. We document that this pattern is also prevalent for the
constituents of the non-interest income share, i.e. commission and fee income, trading income
as well as other non-interest income. Moreover, the observed relationships (also those for the
subcomponents) are similar in a sample of US banks only, even when using a finer split of
the non-interest income generating activities. In future work, it may be worthwhile to focus
exclusively on the US market and exploit the richness of the databases on US bank holding
companies. For example, one may analyze how ownership structure and internal governance
mechanisms, such as executive compensation or institutional ownership, may help in mitigating
the relationship between conflicts of interest and risk-taking incentives in large banking groups.
Data availability is the main limiting factor to analyze these issues in a large cross-country sample
as ours. Alternatively, one may try to exploit plausibly exogenous regulatory changes at the
state level (if any) to explore which specific source of revenue is most affected by the scope for
conflicts of interest.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table shows the total sample summary statistics for the bank- and country-specific variables used throughout
the paper. Bank specific data is retrieved from the Bureau Van Dijck Bankscope database. The full sample contains
16507 bank-year observations over the period 1996-2010 (as the accounting data are lagged one year with respect
to the market-based risk measure). For each variable, we report five statistics, which are calculated at the bank-year
level: the mean and standard deviation of the variables as well as the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile. All variables
are winsorized at the one percent level. The summary statistics for the country-specific variables are calculated at
the country-year level. The full sample contains 869 country-year observations over the period 1996-2010. The
first three country-specific variables, GDP per Capita, Annual GDP Growth and the CPI Rate are used as macro-
economic control variables throughout the paper. Data for these variables is retreived from the WDI database
at the World Bank. The other four country-specific variables are proxies for the information environment in a
country. The Depth of Information Sharing indicator is retrieved from the World Bank Doing Business database.
The Private Monitoring index and Official Supervisory Power Index are taken from the Bank Regulation and
Supervision database (see Barth et al. (2013)). The Freedom of Corruption index is taken from the Heritage
foundation, whereas the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index (HHI) is calculated based on total asset data
retrieved from the Fitch/Bureau Van Dijk Bankscope database.
Variable Mean Standard Deviation5th Percentile Median 95th Percentile
Bank Variables
Marginal Expected Shortfall 1.924 2.354 -0.435 1.323 6.550
Ln(Total assets) 8.004 2.078 5.153 7.638 11.972
Non-Interest Income Share 0.186 0.141 0.033 0.158 0.435
Capital-to-Assets Ratio 9.565 5.969 3.870 8.650 17.500
Share of Deposit Funding 0.924 0.128 0.709 0.969 1.000
Loans to Total Assets 0.623 0.159 0.325 0.647 0.842
Return-on-Equity 8.274 15.389 -14.910 10.240 24.610
Annual Growth in Total Assets 0.096 0.212 -0.142 0.059 0.441
Credit Risk 0.192 0.321 0.000 0.098 0.690
Country Variables
GDP per Capita 8.83 1.356 6.237 9 10.518
GDP Growth - Annual 3.531 3.666 -2.75 3.75 8.9
CPI Inflation Rate 4.637 7.951 0 2.64 13.59
Depth of Information Sharing 4.012 1.788 0 4 6
Private Monitoring 8.232 1.382 6 8 10
Official Supervisory Power 10.981 2.410 6 11 14
Freedom from Corruption 54.839 24.328 22 50 93




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Non-Interest Income on the Marginal Expected Shortfall
This graph plots the marginal effect (fitted coefficient) of the Non-Interest Income share on Marginal Expected
Shortfall over the observed Size range. The graph is based on the estimation results of the baseline specification
on the full sample as in column 2 of Table 3. The coefficient of the Non-Interest Income Share is 5.001 and the
coefficient of the interaction with bank size is -0.728. The solid line represents this estimated linear relationship
over the observed (in our sample) range of ln(Total Assets). The dotted lines correspond with the 95 percent
confidence bounds. The solid line crosses the X-axis at 6.871, corresponding with a value of total assets of 963.7
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